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In this paper, I find (1) that Japan showed massive and persistent current account 
surpluses from at least 1981 and until at least 2011, (2) that Professor Ronald 
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imbalances (the excess of saving over investment), (3) that the specific causes of the IS 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is indeed unfortunate that the eminent economist and Stanford University professor 
Ronald I. McKinnon passed away on October 1, 2014, despite being as active and as 
sharp as ever.  Professor McKinnon’s best-known contribution to economics is probably 
his theory of “financial repression” and his assertion that the biggest impediment to 
economic development is not the lack of capital but the underdeveloped financial system 
(see, for example, McKinnon (1973, 1993)), but he made an equally important 
contribution to the field of international money and finance (see, for example, 
McKinnon (1996) and McKinnon and Ohno (1997)).  
 
One of the centerpieces of Professor McKinnon’s contribution to the field of 
international money and finance was his analysis of the determinants of trade and 
current account balances, and it is on this topic that I focus in this paper.  Thus, the 
objectives of this paper are as follows: (1) to briefly describe Professor McKinnon’s views 
on the determinants of trade and current account balances, (2) to analyze economy-wide 
and sectoral data on trends over time in saving, investment, and IS imbalances (the 
excess of saving over investment) on Japan for the 1980-2013 period to see whether or 
not Professor McKinnon’s views apply in the case of Japan, and (3) to speculate about 
future trends in Japan’s IS imbalances (current account surpluses). 
 
This is an important topic for at least two reasons.  First, Japan showed one of the 
largest trade and current account surpluses in the world until China came along after 
2000.  Second, Japan started showing bilateral trade and current account surpluses 
vis-à-vis the United States in the 1970s, and these bilateral imbalances were the largest 
in the world in the 1980s and 1990s.  This, in turn, led to growing discontent in the 
United States and serious trade frictions between the two countries, with many 
Americans believing and asserting that the imbalances were due largely to “unfair” 
Japanese policies such as industrial policies that fostered export industries, export 
promotion policies, high tariffs and other trade barriers on imports, and an undervalued 
yen, which promoted exports and suppressed imports. 
 
However, McKinnon and Ohno (1997) analyzed this very issue and showed convincingly 
that the persistent bilateral trade and current account imbalances between the United 
States and Japan reflect primarily macroeconomic imbalances in the two countries, 
especially “the increasing American tendency to overspend and the contrasting 
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Japanese proclivity to underspend their respective incomes (McKinnon and Ohno, 1997, 
p. 37).”  In fact, one of Professor McKinnon’s strongest convictions was that trade and 
current account balances are determined primarily by macroeconomic factors such as IS 
imbalances rather than by industrial, commercial, and exchange rate policies, and the 
aforementioned finding is just one specific instance of this general conviction.  One 
objective of this paper is to update the analysis of McKinnon and Ohno (1997) to the 
present and to show that their analysis still applies, at least in the case of Japan. 
 
I sent an earlier incarnation of this paper to Professor McKinnon on October 23, 2010, 
and he replied as follows by email just two days later: “Your analysis of Japan's IS 
balances and its current account surpluses is most convincing.  I agree with you on the 
importance of net saving balances for trade surpluses.”  This is, of course, not 
surprising given how heavily influenced my own way of thinking is by Professor 
McKinnon’s work. 
 
To summarize the main findings of this paper, I find (1) that Japan showed massive and 
persistent current account surpluses from at least 1981 and until at least 2011, (2) that 
Professor McKinnon was correct, at least in the case of Japan, and that these large and 
persistent current account surpluses were due primarily to Japan’s large and persistent 
IS imbalances, (3) that the specific causes of the IS imbalances have changed 
dramatically over time, and (4) that future trends in Japan’s IS imbalances (current 
account surpluses) are difficult to project but that they will probably not change 
dramatically in either direction in the foreseeable future, meaning that what will 
determine global imbalances is not what happens in Japan but what happens in the 
United States, China, and elsewhere. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 is a brief survey of the 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature; section 3 describes the data source;  
section 4 presents data on economy-wide and sectoral saving, investment, and IS 
imbalances in Japan during the 1980- 2013 period in order to shed light on the causes of 
trends over time in Japan’s current account surpluses; section 5 speculates about future 
trends in Japan’s IS imbalances (current account surpluses); and section 6 is a brief 
concluding section. 
 
2. A Brief Survey of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
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Two accounting identities that hold in all countries are as follows: 
 
CA = S – I                                                                    (1) 
CA = X − M + NFI + NCT                                                      (2)  
 
where CA = current account balance, 
S = national saving 
I = domestic investment 
X = exports of goods and services 
M = imports of goods and services 
NFI = net factor income (such as interest and dividends) from abroad 
NCT = net current transfers (such as foreign aid) from abroad 
 
What equation (1) says is that the current account balance is determined by the 
domestic IS imbalance (the excess of saving over investment), just as Professor 
McKinnon believed and asserted.  Why is this?  It is because saving that is not used to 
finance domestic investment has nowhere to go but abroad, and when the excess of 
saving over investment flows abroad, this leads to a capital account deficit equal in 
magnitude to the IS imbalance that must be offset by a current account surplus of 
equivalent magnitude for the country’s balance of payments to remain in equilibrium.   
 
Moreover, as equation (2) shows, the current account balance equals the sum of the 
trade balance, net factor income from abroad, and net current transfers from abroad.  
Since, in most cases, the largest component of the current account balance is the trade 
balance, IS imbalances will be the primary determinant not only of the current account 
balance but also of the trade balance. 
 
There is a contrary view that a country’s industrial, commercial, and exchange rate 
policies will influence its trade and current account balances, but these equations 
demonstrate that such policies will not, by themselves, influence the country’s trade 
and current account balances unless they somehow affect its IS imbalances.  
 
For example, let us suppose that country J reduces or eliminates trade barriers 
(increases or eliminates import quotas) on a certain good, say, beef.  This will lead to 
an increase in imports of beef, which, in turn, will initially reduce the country’s trade 
surplus.  However, this will cause the country’s overall balance of payments to go into 
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deficit (assuming it was initially in equilibrium), which, in turn, will cause the country’s 
currency to depreciate if the country adheres to a flexible exchange rate regime.  This, 
in turn, will lead to an increase in exports, which are now cheaper abroad, and to a 
decrease in imports of goods other than beef, which are now more expensive at home.  
The country’s currency will continue to depreciate until its trade surplus returns to its 
original level and its balance of payments returns to equilibrium.  Thus, the end result 
will be that the country’s trade and current account surpluses will be exactly the same 
as before, with the only difference being a change in the composition of imports and 
exports, with imports of the good whose trade barriers were reduced or eliminated 
increasing, imports of all other goods declining, and exports of all goods 
increasing.  Thus, the reduction or elimination of trade barriers on a particular good 
will benefit foreign producers of that good but will hurt foreign producers of all other 
goods, meaning that such a policy will not necessarily increase the social welfare of  
country J’s trading partners.  Moreover, the same argument can be used to show that 
the elimination of industrial policies and export promotion policies would also not affect 
country J’s trade and current account surpluses and would also not necessarily increase 
the social welfare of country J’s trading partners. 
 
McKinnon and Ohno (1997) corroborated these theoretical expectations by showing 
convincingly that the persistent bilateral trade and current account balances between 
the United States and Japan reflect primarily macroeconomic imbalances in the two 
countries, as noted earlier.  Moreover, other researchers have obtained further 
corroboration of the theory.  For example, Kawai and Takagi (2015) showed, using a 
vector autoregressive model of Japanese net exports, that the real effective exchange 
rate has only a short term (less than 3 year) impact on Japan’s net exports and that the 
medium- to long-term level of net exports are due to fundamental factors such as saving 
and investment. 
 
In sum, both the theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrate that only policies that 
affect IS imbalances will have a long-run impact on trade and current account balances 
and that industrial, commercial, and exchange rate policies will not, by themselves, 
have a long-run impact on trade and current account balances.  The policy implication 
of this finding is that the only way to achieve a permanent reduction in the trade and 
current account surpluses of a country with persistent surpluses is to reduce the IS 
imbalances of that country (either by reducing its saving and/or by increasing its 
investment). 
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3. Data Source 
 
In this section, I discuss the data source used for my analysis.  All data used were 
taken from the National Accounts (Kokumin Keizan Keisan) of the Economic and Social 
Research Institute of the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-fu Keizai Shakai Sougou 
Kenkyuusho) of the Japanese Government.  The data for the 1980-93 period are based 
on the United Nations’ 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) with a benchmark year 
of 2000, while the data for the 1994-2013 period are based on the same SNA but with a 
benchmark year of 2005. 
 
These data are available in published form as well as on-line at the following website: 
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/data/data_list/kakuhou/files/files_kakuhou.html 
 
This source provides data for the economy as a whole as well as for five sectors of the 
economy: (1) households (including private unincorporated enterprises), (2) private 
nonprofit institutions serving households, (3) nonfinancial corporations, (4) financial 
institutions, and (5) the government.  However, for ease of exposition, I combine the 
five sectors into three sectors: (1) and (2) are combined and called the household sector, 
(3) and (4) are combined and called the corporate sector, and (5) is used as is and called 
the government sector.  
 
I will use data on net saving and investment (gross saving and investment minus the 
consumption of fixed capital or depreciation) throughout because it is only net saving 
that leads to increases in net worth and only net investment that leads to increases in 
the capital stock. 
 
Furthermore, I include capital transfers in saving because they are unrequited 
transfers that are used to finance the recipient’s capital formation or capital 
accumulation.  Examples of capital transfers are subsidies from the government to 
private companies for the purpose of financing capital formation and inheritance and 
gift taxes paid by households to the government (the latter are negative transfers from 
the point of view of households).      
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4. Trends over Time in Japan’s Economy-wide and Sectoral Saving, Investment, and IS 
Imbalances 
 
In this section, I present data on the level of, and trends over time in, sectoral and 
economy-wide saving, investment, and IS imbalances (current account balances) in 
Japan from 1980 until 2013 (the most recent year for which data are available) in order 
to shed light on the causes of the level of, and trends over time in, Japan’s current 
account surpluses.1   
 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show trends over time in the ratios of economy-wide saving, 
investment, IS imbalances, and current account balances to gross domestic product 
(GDP) in Japan during the 1980-2013 period (except that current account balances are 
not shown in Figure 1 because they equal IS imbalances except for a statistical 
discrepancy, meaning that the two are almost identical).  As can be seen from this 
figure and table, Japan’s IS imbalances (current account balances) have been in surplus 
in every year since 1981, ranging from 0.41% (0.45%) to 4.77% (4.86%) of GDP and 
averaging 2.51% (2.59%) of GDP, and the magnitude of these imbalances was especially 
large during the 1983-2011 period, ranging from 1.33% (1.40%) to 4.77% (4.86%) of GDP 
and averaging 2.77% (2.85%) of GDP.  Japan’s imbalances exceeded 2% of GDP in 24 
(24) of the 29 years during the 1983-2011 period, exceeded 3% of GDP in 11 (12) of the 29 
years, and exceeded 4% of GDP on two occasions during this period, reaching 4.16% 
(4.18%) of GDP in 1986 and 4.77% (4.86%) of GDP in 2007.  After 2011, Japan’s 
imbalances fell sharply, from 2.03% (2.03%) of GDP in 2011 to 1.00% (1.02%) of GDP in 
2012 and further to 0.52% (0.67%) of GDP in 2013 but remained in surplus.  Japan 
showed such persistent IS imbalances (current account surpluses) throughout the 
1981-2013 period because saving consistently exceeded investment by a considerable 
margin, as can be verified from Figure 1 and Table 1.   
 
Turning to trends over time in Japan’s IS imbalances (current account balances), it can 
be seen from Figure 1 and Table 1 that there were no clear trends in these imbalances 
during the 1980-2013 period even though both saving and investment showed sharp 
downward trends throughout most of this period, with the ratio of saving to GDP 
declining from 17.39% in 1980 to -0.23% in 2009 (except for a temporary rebound in 
1983-89) and the ratio of investment to GDP declining from 18.48% in 1980 to -3.05% in 
2009 (except for a temporary rebound in 1984-90) before recovering slightly.  The 
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reason is that saving and investment showed very similar trends over time during the 
1980-2013 period, as a result of which the sharp decline in saving was largely offset by 
an equally sharp decline in investment, leaving the excess of saving over investment 
largely unchanged.   
 
As noted earlier, Japan’s IS imbalances (current account surpluses) were especially 
large (saving exceeded investment by an especially wide margin) during the 1983-2011 
period, and I will now attempt to shed light on the causes of these imbalances by 
examining data on trends over time in sectoral saving and investment.  Since the 
causes of the large and persistent imbalances were dramatically different during the 
1983-1993 and 1994-2011 periods, I will consider these two periods separately.    
 
4.1. Reasons for the Large IS Imbalances (Current Account Surpluses) during the 
1983-93 Period 
 
Figures 2 and 3 and Table 2 show trends over time in the ratio of sectoral saving and 
sectoral investment to GDP, respectively, in Japan during the 1980-2013 period, and as 
can be seen from these figures and table, the two main causes of the large and 
persistent IS imbalances (current account surpluses) during the earlier 1983-93 period 
were the high levels of household and government saving, which caused economy-wide 
saving to exceed economy-wide investment by a large margin (this finding is perfectly 
consistent with the aforementioned finding of Ohno and McKinnon (1997)).  As shown 
in Figure 2 and Table 2, the ratio of household saving to GDP ranged from 8.10% to 
11.00% and averaged a full 9.19% during this period, whereas it ranged from 0.21% to 
6.52% and averaged only 2.71% during the 1994-2011 period.  Similarly, the ratio of 
government saving to GDP ranged from 0.27% to 6.02% and averaged a full 3.58% 
during the 1983-93 period, whereas it ranged from -8.39% to 1.47% and averaged only 
-3.33% during the 1994-2011 period and was negative in every year after 1997.  
 
Why were household and government saving so high during the 1983-93 period?  
Figure 4 shows trends over time in Japan’s household saving rate (the ratio of 
household saving to the household disposable income) during the 1955-2013 period, and 
as can be seen from this figure, Japan’s household saving rate has been high (in excess 
of 10%) from at least 1955 until at least 1995, reaching as high as 23.2% (nearly 
one-quarter of household disposable income!) in 1974 and 1976.2  There has been a 
voluminous literature on the reasons why Japan’s high household saving rate was so 
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high during most of the postwar period (see, for example, Hayashi (1986, 1997) and 
Horioka (1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2008)).  This literature attributes Japan’s high 
household saving rate to a large number of factors, among them (1) the young age 
structure of the population, (2) the high rate of economic and income growth, (3) the 
inadequacy of public old-age pensions and other social insurance programs, (4) the 
unavailability of housing loans and consumer credit, (5) tax breaks for saving, (6) low 
initial levels of household wealth, (7) the government’s saving promotion activities, (8) 
culture and tradition (especially the Confucian ethic of frugality), and (9) the bonus 
system of compensation whereby a large proportion of one’s salary is paid in the form of 
semiannual bonuses.  Horioka (1989) conducts a cross-country analysis of the 
determinants of the private saving rate in the member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and finds that Japan’s high private 
saving rate is due primarily to the young age structure of its population (the share of 
the aged in Japan’s total population was the lowest among the OECD countries at the 
time) but that other factors also contributed toward elevating Japan’s private saving 
rate; the same conclusions undoubtedly apply to Japan’s household saving rate as well. 
 
Turning to the reasons for the high government saving in Japan during the 1983-93 
period, it was due primarily to the fact that Japan pursued very conservative fiscal 
policies during this period (see Noguchi (1987) for more details).  The Fiscal Act of 1947 
prohibited the issuance of government bonds except to finance public works spending, 
but the Japanese government did even better, following a balanced budget policy and 
not issuing even “construction bonds” (government bonds issued for the purpose of 
financing public works spending) until Fiscal Year 1965.  Furthermore, the Japanese 
government did not issue “deficit bonds” (government bonds issued for the purpose of 
financing government deficits) until Fiscal Year 1975, when the First Oil Crisis of 
1973-74 made it necessary to do so.  Even then, only limited amounts of government 
bonds were issued, and the government embarked on “fiscal reconstruction” efforts soon 
after it first issued “deficit bonds” in Fiscal Year 1975, recommending the introduction 
of a general consumption tax in October 1977, establishing a deficit reduction objective 
in 1980, gradually lowering the ceiling for increases in budget requests by each 
government ministry or agency, and establishing the Ad Hoc Council on Administrative 
Reform, whose mission was to recommend ways of rationalizing government, in March 
1981.  Moreover, tax revenues surged during the economic boom of the late 1980s, 
which further reduced government deficits.  
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Thus, the large IS imbalances (current account surpluses) in Japan during the 1983-93 
period were due primarily to the high levels of household and government saving, which 
are two of the most distinctive and well-known features of the postwar Japanese 
economy.  
 
4.2. Reasons for the Large IS Imbalances (Current Account Surpluses) during the 
1994-2011 Period 
 
Whereas high household and government saving were the main causes of Japan’s large 
IS imbalances (current account surpluses) during the 1983-93 period, both household 
and government saving collapsed during the 1994-2011 period, as already shown (see 
Bosworth (2012) for a discussion of the decline in household and government saving and 
the offsetting increase in corporate saving, to be discussed later).  
 
Looking first at the causes of the collapse of household saving during the 1994-2011 
period, Figure 4 shows that Japan’s household saving rate declined precipitously during 
the 1994-2011 period, from 11.2% in 1994 to 0.4% in 2008 before recovering slightly to 
2.7% in 2011, according to the United Nations’ 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) 
with a benchmark year of 2005.  The share of the aged in Japan’s total population was 
the lowest in the developed world as recently as the 1970s, and this was the main cause 
of Japan’s high household saving rate at the time, as discussed earlier, but it increased 
at the fastest rate in human history and is now the highest in the world.  The single 
most important cause of the collapse of household saving during the 1994-2011 period 
was this rapid population aging, as shown by Horioka (1989, 1991, 1997), but it was 
aided and abetted by the collapse of economic and income growth, the expansion of 
public old-age pensions and the introduction of the public long-term care insurance 
program in April 2000, the increasing availability of housing loans and consumer credit, 
the abolition of most tax breaks for saving in March 1988, rapid increases in household 
wealth holdings due partly to high household saving rates and partly to massive capital 
gains on land and equities, the discontinuation of the government’s saving promotion 
activities, and the weakening of culture and tradition over time.  In short, virtually all 
of the factors responsible for Japan’s high household saving rates in the past have 
weakened or become inapplicable over time, and therefore it is not surprising that 
household saving collapsed during the 1994-2011 period (see Horioka (2008)).  
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The collapse of government saving during the 1994-2011 period was due primarily to 
the twenty-year recession that led to a stagnation of tax revenue and the need for 
stimulative fiscal policies (especially in 1995-96), sharp increases in social spending due 
to the aging of the population, and the long delays in hiking the consumption tax due to 
fierce political opposition (a 3% consumption tax was introduced in April 1989 but it 
could not be increased to 5% until April 1997 and to 8% until April 2014) (see Posen 
(1998) for more details).  As a result, Japan’s gross general government debt to GDP 
ratio in 2012 was by far the highest in the developed world (234.8% vs. 164.2% in Greece, 
136.3% in Portugal, 136.0% in Italy, 131.3% in Ireland, and 123.8% in the United 
States). 
 
Since both household and government saving collapsed during the 1994-2011 period, 
the fact that large IS imbalances (current account surpluses) persisted even during the 
1994-2011 period means that completely different factors were responsible for the large 
imbalances during this period.  As Figures 2 and 3 and Table 2 show, the main causes 
of the IS imbalances (current account surpluses) during the 1994-2011 period were the 
high level of corporate saving and the low levels of corporate investment and 
government saving.  Whereas the ratio of corporate saving to GDP ranged from 1.92% 
to 4.99% and averaged only 3.69% during the 1983-93 period, it was dramatically higher 
during the 1994-2011 period, ranging from 1.95% to 9.00% and averaging a full 6.37%.  
By contrast, whereas the ratio of corporate investment to GDP ranged from 5.08% to 
14.39% and averaged a full 9.78% during the 1983-93 period, it was dramatically lower 
during the 1994-2011 period, ranging from -1.26% to 3.84% and averaging only 1.61% 
during this period.  Similarly, whereas the ratio of government investment to GDP 
ranged from 3.60% to 5.42% and averaging a full 4.17% during the 1983-93 period, it 
was dramatically lower during the 1994-2011 period, ranging from 0.42% to 5.15% and 
averaging only 2.51%.   
 
Why was corporate saving so high and why were corporate and government investment 
so low during the 1994-2011 period?  Corporate saving was high because corporations 
wanted to improve their balance sheets and accumulate retained earnings following the 
financial crises.  Corporate investment was low because of the 20-year recession in 
Japan, poor economic prospects for the future, and the shifting of manufacturing 
production abroad.  Government investment was low because of the government’s 
precarious fiscal situation throughout this period, because Prime Minister Junichiro 
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Koizumi cut public works spending sharply during his years in power (2001-06), and 
because the Democratic Party of Japan did likewise during its years in power (2009-12). 
 
As shown above, Japan has traditionally shown relatively low levels of corporate saving 
and relatively high levels of corporate and government investment.  Thus, the factors 
responsible for the large and persistent IS imbalances (current account surpluses) 
during the 1994-2011 period were not traditional features of the Japanese economy, and 
Japan was able to continue showing large imbalances even after 1993 because the 
economy underwent a massive structural change from a high-growth trajectory with 
high saving and high investment to a low-growth trajectory with low saving and low 
investment and because, by coincidence, the two trajectories produced roughly the same 
magnitude of imbalances for completely different reasons.  
 
4.3. Reasons for the Lower IS Imbalances (Current Account Surpluses) during the 
2012-13 Period 
 
The ratio of Japan’s IS imbalances (current account surpluses) to GDP fell sharply from 
2.03% (2.03%) in 2011 to 0.52% (0.67%) in 2013, as Figure 1 and Table 1 show, despite 
an increase in the ratio of corporate saving to GDP from 7.07% to 8.21% because the 
ratio of household saving to GDP declined further from 2.08% to -0.06%, becoming 
negative for the first time since at least 1955, and because the ratio of household 
investment to GDP increased from -2.42% to -1.14%, as Figures 2 and 3 and Table 2 
show.  The ratio of Japan’s IS imbalances (current account surpluses) to GDP fell even 
further to 0.54% in 2014, but it has been rebounding sharply in 2015 and exceeded 3% 
in the first 6 months of 2015.  Thus, it appears that the decline in Japan’s imbalances 
in 2012-14 may have been only a temporary phenomenon, but unfortunately, data are 
not yet available on sectoral saving and investment in 2014-15 so it is not possible to 
determine the causes of the recent rebound in Japan’s imbalances. 
 
4.4. A Re-interpretation of My Findings using Data on Sectoral IS Imbalances 
 
Figure 5 and Table 2 show trends over time in the ratio of sectoral IS imbalances to 
GDP in Japan during the 1980-2013 period, and as can be seen from this figure and 
table, the aforementioned findings can be recast in terms of sectoral IS imbalances.  
Since high household saving and high government saving were the primary causes of 
the large IS imbalances (current account surpluses) during the earlier 1983-93 period, it 
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is not surprising that household and government IS imbalances were positive and large 
during this period.  The ratio of household IS imbalances to GDP ranged from 6.67% to 
11.65% and averaged a full 9.12% during the 1983-93 period, whereas it ranged from 
0.91% to 6.40% and averaged only 3.41% during the 1994-2011 period.  Similarly, the 
ratio of government IS imbalances to GDP ranged from -4.18% to 2.04% and averaged 
-0.59% (i.e., was only slightly negative) during the 1983-93 period, whereas it ranged 
from      -1.28% to -10.31% and averaged -5.85% (i.e., was very negative) during the 
1994-2011 period. 
 
Similarly, since high corporate saving and low corporate and government investment 
were the primary causes of the large IS imbalances (current account surpluses) during 
the later 1994-2011 period, it is not surprising that corporate IS imbalances were 
positive and large during this period.  The ratio of corporate IS imbalances to GDP 
ranged from -0.88% to 8.98% and averaged a full 4.75% during the 1994-2011 period, 
whereas it ranged from -11.53% to -2.42% and averaged only -6.08% during the 1983-93 
period.  However, since the decline in government saving was larger than the decline in 
government investment during the 1994-2011 period, government IS imbalances were 
lower during this period than during the 1983-93 period, as noted earlier, and thus the 
government sector did not contribute toward elevating economy-wide IS imbalances 
(current account surpluses) during the 1994-2011 period.   
 
Finally, the decline in economy-wide IS imbalances in 2012-13 was due primarily to the 
increase in household saving and the decrease in household investment, both of which  
served to increase the household IS imbalance, so it is not surprising that the ratio of 
the household IS imbalance to GDP declined sharply from 4.50% in 2011 to 1.08% in 
2013. 
 
Thus, all of my findings can be re-interpreted in terms of sectoral IS imbalances, which 
helps to solidify our understanding of what transpired. 
 
5. Future Trends in Japan’s IS Imbalances (Current Account Surpluses) 
 
Having discussed past trends in Japan’s IS imbalances (current account surpluses) and 
the causes thereof, I now speculate about future trends in these imbalances (see Kawai 
and Takagi (2015) for more details).  There are factors that would be expected to cause 
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Japan’s imbalances to increase as well as factors that would be expected to cause them 
to decrease, making it difficult to project future trends therein.   
 
Looking first at factors that would be expected to cause Japan’s imbalances to decline in 
the future, there are at least two such factors.  First, household saving can be expected 
to decline even further as population aging proceeds even further.  Second, corporate 
saving can be expected to taper off once corporate restructuring is completed and 
enough retained earnings have been accumulated for unexpected contingencies. 
 
By contrast, there are at least three factors that can be expected to cause Japan’s 
imbalances to increase in the future.  First, government saving will surely increase 
because the Japanese government will have no choice but to achieve fiscal consolidation 
and reduce its sovereign debt, given that Japan’s gross government debt to GDP ratio is 
the highest in the developed world and borders on unsustainability.  Second, corporate 
investment will remain stagnant even after the economy recovers due to declining 
population, which will alleviate the need to expand the productive capacity of the 
economy, and the continued shift of manufacturing production abroad.  Third, 
government investment will remain stagnant because of the poor state of government 
finances and because the declining population will alleviate the need for additional 
social infrastructure investment. 
 
Thus, there are factors working in both directions and it is not clear whether Japan’s IS 
imbalances (current account surpluses) will increase or decrease, on balance.  It is 
therefore not surprising that there is no consensus regarding future trends in Japan’s 
current account surpluses, with the Japanese government projecting continuing current 
account surpluses, some private institutions and think tanks projecting current account 
deficits by as early as 2015, some projecting current account surpluses until 2020 or 
even later, and academicians (such as Kawai and Takagi (2015)) projecting deficits or 
surpluses depending on which scenario is used.  What is clear is that Japan’s 
imbalances will not change dramatically in either direction in the foreseeable future 
and therefore that what will determine global imbalances is not what happens in Japan 
but what happens in the United States, China, and elsewhere.   
 
One last caveat is that, because the Japanese hold a considerable amount of foreign 
assets, they will earn a considerable amount of investment income abroad and therefore 
14 
 
that Japan’s trade balance will be in deficit even if its current account balance is in 
surplus unless its current account surplus is of sufficient magnitude.    
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I (1) briefly described Professor McKinnon’s views on the determinants of 
trade and current account balances, (2) analyzed economy-wide and sectoral data on 
trends over time in saving, investment, and IS imbalances on Japan for the 1980-2013 
period to see whether or not Professor McKinnon’s views apply in the case of Japan, and 
(3) speculated about future trends in Japan’s IS imbalances (current account surpluses). 
 
To summarize the main findings of this paper, I found (1) that Japan showed massive 
and persistent current account surpluses from at least 1981 and until at least 2011, (2) 
that Professor McKinnon was correct, at least in the case of Japan, and that these large 
and persistent current account surpluses were due primarily to Japan’s large and 
persistent IS imbalances (the excess of saving over investment), (3) that the specific 
causes of the IS imbalances have changed dramatically over time, and (4) that future 
trends in Japan’s IS imbalances (current account surpluses) are difficult to project but 
that they will probably not change dramatically in either direction in the foreseeable 
future, meaning that what will determine global imbalances is not what happens in 
Japan but what happens in the United States, China, and elsewhere. 
 
Thus, Professor McKinnon’s views about the determinants of trade and current account 
balances are correct, at least in the case of Japan, and can be used not only to analyze 
the causes of past trends in the current account balances of individual countries and to 
forecast future trends therein but also to help us to understand and predict global 
imbalances.  Professor McKinnon’s research in this area is therefore of great 
importance not only to economists but also to practitioners and policymakers, and he 
will be sorely missed for this reason as well as many others.   
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Figure 1: Trends in Economy-wide Saving, Investment, and IS Imbalances, 1980-2013 
 
Notes: Denote the ratios of economy-wide saving, investment, and IS imbalances to gross domestic 
product (GDP) (in percent). 
The figures for 1980-1993 are based on the United Nations’ 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) 
with a benchmark year of 2000, while the figures for 1994-2013 are based on the same SNA with a 
benchmark year of 2005. 
Data Source: National Accounts (Kokumin Keizan Keisan) of the Economic and Social Research 
Institute of the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-fu Keizai Shakai Sougou Kenkyuusho) of the Japanese 
Government.  See main text for details. 
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Figure 2: Trends in Sectoral and Economy-wide Saving, 1980-2013 
 
Notes: Denote the ratios of sectoral (household, corporate, and government) and economy-wide saving 
to gross domestic product (GDP) (in percent). 
The figures for 1980-1993 are based on the United Nations’ 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) 
with a benchmark year of 2000, while the figures for 1994-2013 are based on the same SNA with a 
benchmark year of 2005. 
Data Source: National Accounts (Kokumin Keizan Keisan) of the Economic and Social Research 
Institute of the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-fu Keizai Shakai Sougou Kenkyuusho) of the Japanese 
Government.  See main text for details. 
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Figure 3: Trends in Sectoral and Economy-wide Investment, 1980-2013 
 
Notes: Denote the ratios of sectoral (household, corporate, and government) and economy-wide 
investment to gross domestic product (GDP) (in percent). 
The figures for 1980-1993 are based on the United Nations’ 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) 
with a benchmark year of 2000, while the figures for 1994-2013 are based on the same SNA with a 
benchmark year of 2005. 
Data Source: National Accounts (Kokumin Keizan Keisan) of the Economic and Social Research 
Institute of the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-fu Keizai Shakai Sougou Kenkyuusho) of the Japanese 
Government.  See main text for details. 
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Figure 4: Trends in the Household Saving Rate, 1955-2013 
 
 
Notes: Denote the ratio of net saving to net disposable income of households including private 
unincorporated enterprises but not including private non-profit institutions serving households (in 
percent). 
The solid line shows figures based on the United Nations’ 1968 System of National Accounts (SNA) 
with a benchmark year of 1990, the dashed line shows figures based on the United Nations’ 1993 
System of National Accounts (SNA) with a benchmark year of 2000, and the dotted line shows figures 
based on the same SNA with a benchmark year of 2005. 
Data Source: National Accounts (Kokumin Keizan Keisan) of the Economic and Social Research 
Institute of the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-fu Keizai Shakai Sougou Kenkyuusho) of the Japanese 
Government.  See main text for details. 
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Figure 5: Trends in Sectoral and Economy-wide IS Imbalances, 1980-2013 
 
Notes: Denote the ratios of sectoral (household, corporate, and government) and economy-wide IS 
imbalances to gross domestic product (GDP) (in percent). 
The figures for 1980-1993 are based on the United Nations’ 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) 
with a benchmark year of 2000, while the figures for 1994-2013 are based on the same SNA with a 
benchmark year of 2005. 
Data Source: National Accounts (Kokumin Keizan Keisan) of the Economic and Social Research 
Institute of the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-fu Keizai Shakai Sougou Kenkyuusho) of the Japanese 
Government.  See main text for details. 
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Notes: Denote the ratios of economy-wide saving, investment, IS imbalances, and current account 
surpluses to gross domestic product (GDP) (in percent).   
The figures for 1980-1993 are based on the United Nations’ 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) 
with a benchmark year of 2000, while the figures for 1994-2013 are based on the same SNA with a 
benchmark year of 2005. 
Data Source: National Accounts (Kokumin Keizan Keisan) of the Economic and Social Research 
Institute of the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-fu Keizai Shakai Sougou Kenkyuusho) of the Japanese 
Government.  See main text for details. 
Calendar Year Saving Investment IS Imbalance Current Account Balance
1980 17.39 18.48 -1.09 -1.05
1981 17.29 16.88 0.41 0.45
1982 15.98 15.36 0.62 0.66
1983 14.81 13.10 1.71 1.76
1984 15.72 12.99 2.73 2.77
1985 17.16 13.51 3.65 3.68
1986 17.19 13.03 4.16 4.18
1987 16.63 13.23 3.41 3.44
1988 18.03 15.40 2.63 2.66
1989 18.14 16.06 2.08 2.12
1990 18.01 16.58 1.43 1.46
1991 17.58 15.66 1.92 1.95
1992 16.16 13.23 2.93 2.96
1993 14.36 11.37 3.00 3.03
1994 10.73 8.08 2.65 2.69
1995 10.66 8.63 2.03 2.07
1996 10.62 9.29 1.33 1.40
1997 10.46 8.31 2.15 2.24
1998 8.28 5.62 2.65 3.03
1999 6.43 4.22 2.21 2.59
2000 7.18 4.85 2.33 2.53
2001 6.05 4.01 2.04 2.11
2002 4.80 2.05 2.75 2.83
2003 5.33 2.26 3.07 3.16
2004 6.12 2.53 3.59 3.70
2005 5.88 2.35 3.52 3.63
2006 5.99 2.17 3.82 3.93
2007 6.91 2.14 4.77 4.86
2008 4.45 1.24 3.21 3.32
2009 -0.23 -3.05 2.82 2.92
2010 1.93 -1.69 3.62 3.71
2011 0.64 -1.39 2.03 2.03
2012 0.69 -0.31 1.00 1.02
2013 0.43 -0.09 0.52 0.67
1983-1993 16.71 14.02 2.69 2.73
1994-2011 6.23 3.42 2.81 2.93
Table 1: Trends in Economy-wide Saving, Investment, IS Imbalances, and Current Account Balances
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Notes: Denote the ratios of sectoral (household, corporate, and government) saving, investment, and IS 
imbalances to gross domestic product (GDP) (in percent). 
The figures for 1980-1993 are based on the United Nations’ 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) 
with a benchmark year of 2000, while the figures for 1994-2013 are based on the same SNA with a 
benchmark year of 2005. 
Data Source: National Accounts (Kokumin Keizan Keisan) of the Economic and Social Research 
Institute of the Cabinet Office (Naikaku-fu Keizai Shakai Sougou Kenkyuusho) of the Japanese 
Government.  See main text for details. 
  
Calendar
Year Saving Investment IS Imbalance Saving Investment IS Imbalance Saving Investment IS Imbalance
1980 11.65 4.39 7.25 5.88 8.79 -2.91 0.65 5.30 -4.66
1981 12.13 3.05 9.09 4.50 8.57 -4.07 1.21 5.26 -4.05
1982 11.31 3.28 8.03 4.31 7.26 -2.96 0.80 4.81 -4.01
1983 11.00 1.51 9.48 3.88 7.13 -3.26 0.27 4.45 -4.18
1984 10.71 1.47 9.25 3.96 7.41 -3.45 1.35 4.11 -2.77
1985 10.24 -0.46 10.70 4.38 10.38 -5.99 2.17 3.60 -1.43
1986 9.41 -0.11 9.52 4.99 9.48 -4.49 2.24 3.66 -1.43
1987 8.10 -0.48 8.58 4.88 9.75 -4.87 3.58 3.96 -0.38
1988 8.41 1.18 7.23 4.69 10.12 -5.43 4.63 4.11 0.52
1989 8.55 -1.13 9.68 3.66 13.37 -9.71 5.11 3.82 1.29
1990 8.12 -1.78 9.90 3.12 14.39 -11.26 6.02 3.98 2.04
1991 9.21 -2.44 11.65 2.50 14.04 -11.53 5.81 4.06 1.75
1992 8.77 2.10 6.67 1.92 6.40 -4.48 5.33 4.73 0.60
1993 8.57 0.87 7.70 2.66 5.08 -2.42 2.92 5.42 -2.49
1994 6.52 1.80 4.72 1.95 1.13 0.82 1.47 5.15 -3.68
1995 6.32 -0.07 6.40 2.94 3.82 -0.88 0.32 4.88 -4.56
1996 5.07 1.53 3.54 4.54 2.75 1.79 0.11 5.02 -4.90
1997 4.71 0.43 4.28 4.46 3.80 0.66 0.30 4.09 -3.79
1998 5.60 -0.35 5.95 8.55 2.12 6.43 -6.45 3.86 -10.31
1999 4.68 0.03 4.66 4.76 0.06 4.70 -3.00 4.14 -7.14
2000 3.80 -2.31 6.11 7.35 3.84 3.51 -4.19 3.32 -7.51
2001 1.84 -1.65 3.49 6.35 2.61 3.75 -2.99 3.05 -6.04
2002 1.61 0.67 0.93 7.72 -1.26 8.98 -5.07 2.64 -7.71
2003 1.27 -1.04 2.31 9.00 1.19 7.81 -5.55 2.12 -7.67
2004 1.05 -0.01 1.05 8.72 0.89 7.84 -4.30 1.65 -5.95
2005 0.63 -0.50 1.14 8.54 1.61 6.93 -3.57 1.24 -4.81
2006 0.47 -0.44 0.91 5.64 1.64 4.00 -0.31 0.97 -1.28
2007 0.49 -1.72 2.20 7.55 3.12 4.43 -1.35 0.74 -2.09
2008 0.21 -2.00 2.22 5.18 2.72 2.46 -1.34 0.52 -1.86
2009 1.33 -2.81 4.14 6.13 -1.00 7.12 -8.08 0.76 -8.84
2010 1.14 -1.77 2.90 8.14 -0.60 8.74 -7.64 0.67 -8.31
2011 2.08 -2.42 4.50 7.07 0.60 6.47 -8.39 0.42 -8.81
2012 0.79 -0.99 1.78 8.25 0.23 8.01 -8.21 0.45 -8.66
2013 -0.06 -1.14 1.08 8.21 0.30 7.91 -7.71 0.75 -8.46
1983-1993 9.19 0.07 9.12 3.69 9.78 -6.08 3.58 4.17 -0.59
1994-2011 2.71 -0.70 3.41 6.37 1.61 4.75 -3.33 2.51 -5.85
Household Sector Corporate Sector Government Sector
Table 2: Trends in Sectoral Saving, Investment, and IS Imbalances, 1980-2013
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Endnotes 
                                                   
1 See McKinnon and Ohno (1997), Bosworth (2012), and Bosworth and Collins (2015) 
for a similar analysis for the United States, Huang and Tao (2015) for a similar analysis 
for China, Kawai and Takagi (2015) for a similar analysis for Japan, and Bosworth and 
Kawai (2015) for a useful survey of all countries.   
 
2 Note that the household saving rates shown in Figure 4 are not directly comparable to 
the figures on household saving shown in Figure 2 and Table 2 because the denominator 
is household disposable income rather than GDP and because the saving of private 
non-profit institutions serving households is not included. 
